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Non-technical summary
The potential effect of public debt on government bond yields is an important issue for economists and fiscal policy makers alike. If government bond yields include risk premia, increasing indebtedness may cause bond yields to go up, thus raising the cost of borrowing and imposing discipline on governments. Market discipline of this kind may be especially relevant and important in a monetary union, such as EMU, in which the governments of the member states can issue debt, but do not have the possibility to monetize and inflate away excessive debts.
In this paper, we contribute to the research on sovereign risk premia in three ways. First, we estimate the effects of fiscal variables on long term government bond yields, using a new data set. Our data consists of spreads between Deutsche Mark (Euro after 1999) and US dollar denominated bond issues of 12 EU governments and Germany or the US government, respectively. Second, using data from before and after the start of EMU, we can directly estimate the effects of monetary union on risk premia paid by European governments. Third, our empirical analysis distinguishes risk premia from liquidity effects in the bond market Our results show that yield spreads between EU countries and Germany or the USA are affected by international risk factors and reflect positive default and liquidity risk premia. The default risk premium is positively affected by the debt and debt service ratios of the issuer country. This is consistent with the notion that credit markets monitor fiscal performance and exert disciplinary pressure on governments. Countries whose national debt has a larger share in the total EU debt pay lower interest rates than EU countries with smaller shares.
The liquidity risk premium, which compensates an investor for the risk that he may not be able to liquidate his investment within a reasonable time, is reduced with EMU membership, which points to an increase in financial market integration.
Additionally, EMU members enjoy a lower default risk premium than before, but this benefit declines with the size of public debt compared to Germany. This is consistent with the view that markets may anticipate fiscal support for EMU countries in financial distress unless these countries had been very undisciplined before. In contrast, the impact 5 ECB Working Paper Series No. 369 June 2004 of debt service on interest rates rises with EMU. Thus, monetary union does not seem to have weakened the disciplinary function of credit markets.
Introduction
The potential effects of public debt on government bond yields is an important issue for economists and fiscal policy makers alike. If government bond yields include risk premia, increasing indebtedness may cause bond yields to go up, thus raising the cost of borrowing and imposing discipline on governments. Market discipline of this kind may be especially relevant and important in a monetary union, such as the US or the new European Monetary Union (EMU), in which the governments of the member states can issue debt, but do not have the possibility to monetize and inflate away excessive debts.
The question whether such risk premia can be identified empirically and how large they are has attracted considerable interest in recent literature. Goldstein and Woglom (1991) , Bayoumi, Goldstein and Woglom (1995) and Poterba and Rueben (1997) find that the yield differentials of 39 US states relative to New Jersey depend positively on their levels of debt. Alesina, De Broeck, Prati and Tabellini (1992) use data from 12 OECD countries and show that the differential between public and private bond yields is positively related to the level of public debt. Lemmen (1999) uses yields of bonds issued by state governments in Australia, Canada, and Germany and shows that yield spreads depend positively on the ratio of government debt to GDP. Alexander and Anker (1997) , Lemmen and Goodhart (1999) , Lonning (2000) , Copeland and Jones (2001) and Codogno, Favero and Missale (2003) consistently confirm a positive relationship between public debt and interest rates. Faini (2004) finds an effect of fiscal variables on both interest rate spreads and the overall level in an empirical study of euro area countries.
In this paper, we contribute to this line of research in three ways. First, we estimate the effects of fiscal variables on long term government bond yields, using a new data set. Our data consists of yield-at-issue spreads between DM (Euro after 1999) and US dollar denominated bonds issued by several EU governments and Germany or the US government, respectively. This data set has several advantages compared to those used in earlier studies. Looking at DM (Euro) and US dollar denominated bonds allows us to look at debt issued by national and sub-national governments without introducing the issue of exchange rate risk that arises in the comparison of bonds issued by national governments in their national currencies. 1 Furthermore, the comparison of spreads on such issues is not distorted by differences in national tax regimes. Finally, looking at yields-at-issue assures the comparability of yields at different points in time, since, in contrast to average yields on debt outstanding, the residual maturity is always the full maturity and the bonds are actively traded on the day when the yields are recorded.
Second, using data from before and after the start of EMU Third, our empirical analysis distinguishes risk premia from liquidity effects in the bond market. Identifying the liquidity component of yield spreads is important, because it points to a lack of financial market integration rather than differences in public debt as a source of yield differentials. 2 Empirically, we observe that German government bond yields are still below those of bonds issued by governments with much better debt positions. This has been interpreted as showing that bond yields do not reflect fiscal performance appropriately (Reuters, June 2002) . But the fact that German bonds enjoy a yield advantage compared to others may instead be due to the size of the German bond market and the fact that German bonds can be traded immediately at lower transaction costs and with a smaller risk of price changes due to individual transactions.
1 Alesina et al. (1992) , Flandreau et al. (1998 ), Goodhart (1999 , and Afonso et al. (2003) propose to circumvent this issue by comparing the returns on government debt and 'safe' private debt of corresponding maturity denominated in the same currency. It is not clear, however, that the credit risk of private firms is independent of the credit risk of their national governments, as governments in financial crisis might seize private assets or raise taxes and, thus, worsen the borrower quality of private firms. 2 Blanco (2001) finds significant liquidity premia in the relative pricing of German bonds. Codogno et al. (2003) find a significant effect of trading volumes on euro-area government bond yields supporting the existence of liquidity premia. Gómez-Puig (2003) finds that liquidity, measured by bid-ask spreads, plays an important role in explaining the spreads between euro-denominated bonds issued by different governments.
Our paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents a discrete-time, two-asset portfolio model explaining interest rate differentials between bonds issued by two different governments. It serves to motivate the empirical analysis and derive the reduced-form equation estimated subsequently. Section 3 describes the data we use for the estimation. Section 4 reports the estimation results, and Section 5 concludes. 
A Portfolio Model of Bond Yield Differentials

The Basic Model
The investor allocates a fraction θ of his real wealth w t to a domestic security D and a fraction of 1-θ to a foreign security F. Both securities and real wealth are priced in the foreign currency, so that:
We assume that the domestic security is subject to default risk, while the foreign asset is considered risk-free. More specifically, with a positive probability of 1-P(x t ), 0≤ P(x t )≤1, the domestic government will be unable to fully serve its debt. Here, x t indicates a set of variables affecting this probability. In the case of default, the investor receives a fraction τ of his gross payment, τ ∈ [0, 1 + r), where r is the interest rate on the domestic bond.
Investors incur transaction costs proportional to their investment in bonds which decrease with the liquidity of the bond market. We assume that the foreign bond has benchmark status in the bond market, i.e., the foreign bond market is considered to be more liquid than the domestic bond market. Expected wealth then is: 
where an asterix in the equation indicates the corresponding foreign variables, l is the expected transaction cost in the domestic bond market, and the transaction cost in the foreign market is normalized to zero. The objective function and the budget equations for a representative investor in the foreign country are analogue to the equations (1) Due to the uncertain investment return of domestic securities, the variance of next period's real wealth of the domestic and the foreign investor is non-zero and given by:
for the domestic investor and
for the foreign investor. Utility maximization yields the optimal shares invested in domestic securities, t θˆ and Let S be the total supply of bonds issued by the domestic government.
Equilibrium in the domestic bond market requires:
This can be solved for the interest rate differential: 
In what follows, by the interest rate spread or differential, we mean the term on the left Equation (11) separates the yield spread between the two bonds into three terms.
The first term on the right hand side reflects the default risk premium. It depends positively on the default probability of the risky issuer country, (1 -P(x t )). The default risk premium decreases with an increase in the fraction of repayment the investor receives in case of default,τ. Since τ ranges between 0 and (1 + r t ), the default risk premium is always positive.
Second, the bond yield differential depends on the liquidity risk premium. The more liquid the domestic bond market, the smaller will be the liquidity risk premium.
The third term is the country-specific risk premium. It depends negatively on τ and positively on the variance of the default probability P(x t )(1 -P(x t )), the gross nominal return (1 + r t ), and the level of the relative risk aversion of investor Φ and Φ * .
The more investors care about the variance of their future wealth w t+1 (the larger U 2 ), the larger will be the interest rate differential between the risky and the risk-free country.
Furthermore, the country specific risk premium increases with the total supply of domestic bonds, S, relative to total wealth.
The Reduced-form Equation
To test this model empirically, we estimate the following equation:
The dependent variable is the yield spread of a bond issued in EU country i over the benchmark in currency j. z it is a vector containing several variables related to fiscal performance, two dummies for the authority level of the issuing government, an indicator of the cyclical stance of the economy, a liquidity variable, and a maturity variable.
The fiscal variables reflect the government's quality as a borrower. We use three fiscal variables in our regression. The first two are motivated by their common use in policy debates and the Maastricht Treaty. These are the debt/GDP ratio and the deficit/GDP ratio. The third is the ratio of government debt service to current government revenues. This variable is closer in spirit to measures of borrower quality commonly used in corporate finance, such as the ratio of debt service to cash flow. It
ECB Working Paper Series No. 369
June 2004 allows for the fact that governments in different countries may differ in their ability to raise taxes from a given volume of GDP, and it focuses on the constraint high debt burdens impose on the annual budgetary flows. All three fiscal variables relate to the general government. They are measured as the difference relative to the benchmark country Germany (respectively, the USA) in the case of DM/Euro bonds (respectively, US$ bonds). We include levels and quadratic terms of the fiscal variables to allow for non-linear relationships.
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The dummies for the level of government are one for debt issued by state or provincial authorities (SA) and debt issued by local authorities (LA), respectively. Since state and governments have less fiscal sovereignty and tax collecting capacities than national governments, it is likely yields on bonds issued by sub-national governments contain larger default risk premia than central government bond rates.
4
The inclusion of an indicator of the cyclical stance follows the suggestion of Alesina et al. (1992) that default risk depends on the overall economic situation of a country. In an economic slow-down, government revenues decrease, and the probability of default may rise. Since such effects most likely relate to severe recessions and strong upswings rather than small cyclical movements, our indicator takes the value 1, when the nominal GDP of a country is more than half a standard deviation above its trend (boom),
-1 when it is more than half a standard deviation below its trend (recession), and 0 otherwise. Using sample standard deviations accounts for the fact that the volatility of the business cycle varies substantially across countries. The difference of this variable between the issuer and the benchmark country is zero, if both countries are in the same cyclical position; it is (-2) and (2), if one is in a strong boom and the other in a strong recession, and (-1) and 1 in the case of less severe differences in the cyclical stance.
5
The liquidity variable serves to estimate the liquidity premium. Due to lack of data, we cannot follow the conventional approach to use bid-ask spreads, which reflect trading costs in trading securities (Fleming, 2003) . However, Gravelle (1999) shows that the correlation between bid-ask spreads and the total supply of debt is significantly negative. This suggests that total volume of supply of a security has a positive effect on its liquidity. Following this reasoning, we assume that liquidity depends on market size and, additionally, that all debt issued by a government in a given currency is homogeneous up to maturity. Thus, the liquidity premium is assumed to be proportional to the ratio of the debt issued by a government in DM/Euro or US$ to the total debt of EU countries issued in DM/Euro or US$.
6
The maturity variable contained in vector z it measures the time to maturity of the bonds at the time of issue and controls for the possibility that default premia vary with the length of the contract. In this case, an investor receives a compensation for investing in long-term bonds instead of buying short-term bonds and rolling them over.
Our model suggests that the general investors' risk aversion towards credit risk determines the yield spread between countries. This suggestion is supported by the empirical observations. Dungey et al. (2000) show strong evidence of a common international factor in many yield differentials. Deutsche Bank Research (2001) notes that interest rate differentials between EMU member countries widened in periods of financial crises such as the Russian crisis in 1998 or the Turkish currency crisis in 2001. Lemmen (1999) observes that the difference between provincial and federal yields in Australia, Canada, Germany, Switzerland and the US widened considerably after the outbreak of the Asian crisis in 1997 and the Russian default of August 1998. Thus, it seems that in periods of global financial crises or uncertainty investors move to safer and more liquid assets and that bond yield spreads increase as a result.
Since investors' risk aversion is not directly observable, we use the yield spread between low grade US corporate bonds (BBB) and benchmark US government bonds as an empirical proxy. 7 Figure 1 illustrates the development of this proxy between 1990 and 2002. After the peak in the early months of 1991, when the yield spread was more than 2.5 basis points, one observes a continuous downward trend of the corporate-government 6 We also used the issue size as an alternative proxy for liquidity, but since this variable shows insignificant coefficients, we exclude it from reported regression analysis. 7 A variable that measures the respective corporate bond spread for the complete Euroarea is not available, but the empirical literature on sovereign bond spreads of emerging markets shows that spreads are sensitive to US risk factors (see, e.g., Barnes et al. (1997) , Kamin et al. (1999) , Eichengreen et al. (2000) ). Therefore, data on US corporate-government bond yield spreads can be used as a good proxy for the overall investors' risk attitude.
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Data Description
Data
The data on the yield spreads were provided by Capital DATA Bondware. We compare government bonds issued by the 13 EU countries, i.e., Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Ireland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the UK, between 1991 and beginning of 2002 that are denominated on the one hand in DM before 1998 and subsequently in Euro, and on the other hand in US$. In this way, interest differentials will be net of expected changes in exchange rates between currencies. Alesina et al. (1992) argue that default risk premia might be lower for foreigncurrency than domestic-currency issues, if countries issue little debt in foreign currencies and because a country has much to lose by defaulting in international markets. Table A2 in the Appendix reports the amount of US$ and DM denominated bond issues of each country during our sample period in million Euros. The figures suggest that this concern is not substantiated for our data set. Except France, all EU countries issued a large The interest differential for the DM/Euro denominated bonds is measured as the difference in the yield to maturity at the time of issue between the national bond under consideration and an equivalent German government bond. Similarly, the differential for the bonds issued in US$ is the difference to an equivalent US government bond. In each case, we take the German or US benchmark indicated by Capital DATA Bondware, which is the nearest new issue of the German or US federal government, respectively.
The whole data set consists of 185 DM/Euro bond spreads and 132 US$ bond spreads
variables. This suggests that the impact of fiscal variables on government bond yield spreads will be biased downwards when controlling for country fixed effects, since the latter also reflect the default risk of each country. For this reason, we do not focus our discussion on regressions with country fixed effects. The estimation results with country fixed effects are available from the authors on request.
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June 2004 issued by all 15 EU countries. 97 of these DM/Euro denominated bonds and 90 of these US$ bonds are issued before EMU. Recall that, in view of equation (11), all interest differentials are divided by the gross interest rate factor of the respective national bond. The difference of the business cycle variable between the issuer country and the benchmark county, which collates the value 1 when the detrended and standardized nominal GDP is bigger than 0.5, the value -1, when it is smaller then -0.5 and 0 otherwise. The corporate spreads variable, which measures the difference between 7 to 10 year low grade corporate bonds (BBB) and 7 to 10 year benchmark government bonds in the USA, is provided by Merrill Lynch. All other macro variables like the debt/GDP, deficit/GDP, debt service/revenue, and the liquidity measured as the share of the issuers debt over the overall European debt, are provided by Ameco.
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Detailed summary statistics of all variables used in the regressions are listed in Table 1 .
A Descriptive Look at the Data
Figures A1 -A3 in the Appendix plot the yield spreads of EU central government bond issues over time. The figures exclude bonds issued by state and provincial governments, since we expect these to incorporate a positive risk premium, and their inclusion would, in this case, deteriorate the graphical analysis.
A striking aspect of Figure A2 is the outlier of a Swedish bond issued in 1992.
With a yield of more than 450 basis points above an equivalent US government bond, this observation is more than four times higher than all other yield spreads in this data set. The Swedish financial crisis in 1992 is a reasonable explanation and provides evidence of financial markets' concern that Sweden might have had serious problems repaying its debt. In Figure A3 we drop this outlier to better illustrate of the development of the remaining bond yield spreads.
As shown, the bond yields of all EU countries converged between 1991 and 1997 to German and US levels. This development may reflect the increased fiscal discipline of the EU countries during this period. After 1997, except for Greece, there is a divergence of EU interest rates relative to German and US levels. supports our hypothesis that fiscal discipline has a decreasing effect on government bond yields. The positive relationship between these fiscal variables and bond yield spreads seems to be mainly driven by the Greek observations. It is interesting that, although the Belgium debt ratio is much higher, Belgium yield spreads are not higher than the yield spreads of Denmark. Tables 2 and 3 report the estimation results for the DM/Euro denominated bonds with and without time fixed effects. The first regression in both tables contains all three fiscal variables, the debt/GDP, deficit/GDP and debt service/revenue differential, while the following regressions include each of them separately to control for collinearity and exclude insignificant variables. Since the time fixed effects improve the precision of the estimates without changing the basic results, we focus the discussion on the estimates in Table 3 .
Estimation Results
DM/Euro Bonds
The results indicate that a positive relation between yield spreads and the fiscal variables, and that EMU membership changes this relation significantly. Before EMU, and for non-EMU countries after 1998, an increasing debt ratio relative to Germany widens the interest rate spread with small decreasing marginal effects. This result contradicts the 'credit punishing hypothesis' of Goldstein and Woglom's (1991) and supports the estimation results of Lemmen and Goodhart (1999) . A debt ratio exceeding Germany's by 25 percent of GDP causes a yield spread of 30 basis points, while a debt ratio exceeding Germany's by 50 percent results in a yield spread of 47.5 basis points.
EMU membership reduces the linear effect of debt on interest rates, but increases the nonlinear, marginal effect. 11 The results imply that the risk premium is lower after the start of EMU for countries with debt ratios no larger than 68.5 percent above Germany's ratio and higher for countries with debt ratios larger than that. This is consistent with the view that markets anticipate fiscal support for EMU countries in financial distress unless these countries had been very undisciplined before. Regression (3) shows that an increasing deficit ratio relative to Germany increases the yield differential with positive marginal effects. Before EMU, and for non-EMU countries after 1998, a deficit differential of one percent relative to Germany causes a yield spread of 3.39 basis point.
12 If the deficit rises from one percent to two percent relative to Germany, the yield differential increases by 5.33 basis points due to the non-linear effect. EMU-membership changes this punishing effect significantly. The EMU dummy interacted with the deficit variables shows negative and significant coefficients in both tables. In the regression without time fixed effects, a F-test does not reject the hypothesis that the effect of deficits on interest rates vanishes after the start of EMU. When we control for time fixed effects, this hypothesis is rejected at the 3 percent significance level. This result may be driven by the fact that the two largest member countries, Germany and France, had the largest deficits in the early years of EMU.
According to regression (4), the impact of the debt service ratio on interest rates is positive and shows an increasing marginal effect, which supports the 'credit punishing' hypothesis. Before EMU, and for non-EMU countries after 1998, a debt service/revenue differential of five percent relative to Germany causes an interest rate spread of 4.43 basis points. With EMU, the debt service ratio gains in importance. A debt service/revenue differential of the same magnitude in an EMU country explains an interest spread of around 14 basis points. The R 2 is higher in the regressions when the debt service ratio is included than in the regressions with either debt or deficit ratios as alternative regressors. Accordingly, this fiscal variable explains more of the variation in yield spreads across EU countries than debt and deficit ratios, the two variables commonly used in policy debates and the Maastricht Treaty.
The Business Cycle variable shows negative and significant coefficients in the regressions without controlling for fixed effects. Accordingly, when the issuing country is in a good economic condition relative to Germany, its interest differential decreases. In Table 3 the coefficients of this variable turn out to be insignificant, since year dummies filter the effect of business cycle variations on yield spreads. The dummies SA and LA are positive and significant in all regression. Local governments' interest rates are 15 basis points higher than the interest rate on central government bonds.
12 Note that deficits are expressed by positive figures.
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June 2004 Yield differentials across European countries reflect liquidity risk. The liquidity variable shows negative and significant coefficients in almost all regressions. An increase of the relative debt size by one percent causes a reduction of the issuer country's interest rate by around 0.7 basis points. An interesting result is that this liquidity effect diminishes or even vanishes with EMU, as shown by the positive and significant coefficients on the Liquidity*EMU variable in most regressions. This is consistent with the notion that financial market integration has become more complete in Europe.
In half of our regressions, the Corporate Spread variable has positive and significant coefficients. Accordingly, in periods of high risk aversion, measured by a large spread between low grade US corporate bonds and US government bonds, the interest differentials of EU countries versus Germany rise. When the corporategovernment bond yield spread increases by one percent, Germany pays an interest rate that is an additional 20 basis points smaller than the one of other EU countries. The impact of fiscal performance and market liquidity on yield spreads seems to stay unaffected by the degree of investors' risk aversion.
Finally, yield spreads increase by around 1.6 basis points with every additional year to maturity. Tables 4 and 5 show the estimation results for US$ denominated bonds. 13 The regressions in the second table are estimated with year dummies and therefore control for time fixed effects. We focus the discussion of the estimation results on the estimates reported in Table 5 .
US$ Bonds
The estimation results support that yield spreads between EU countries and the USA are affected by fiscal performance. The yield spread increases with the debt, deficit, and debt service differential between the issuer country and the USA. The debt ratio shows decreasing marginal effects and the debt service ratio increasing marginal effects on interest rates. According to regression (2), a debt differential of 25 percent causes for non-EMU countries a yield spread of 35.5 basis points. The significant coefficients on 13 For the estimations, we dropped the Swedish outlier described in Section 4.2. 
Conclusions
This paper contributes to the literature on the impact of fiscal policies on interest rates by analyzing the role of capital markets on the sustainability of public finances in the euroarea. We examine whether bond yield differentials across EU countries are determined by default and/or liquidity risk aspects, and whether EMU had significant impact on bond pricing. We exploit a unique data set of US$ and Euro denominated government bond issue spreads between 1991 and 2002, which has the advantage that we can ignore exchange risks and distortions by differences in national tax regimes.
Our results show that yield spreads of EU countries versus Germany or the USA reflect positive default and liquidity risk premia. The default risk premium is positively affected by the debt and debt service ratios of the issuer country. This is consistent with the notion that credit markets monitor fiscal performance and exert disciplinary pressure on governments. The debt service variable explains more variation in yield spreads across EU countries than both the debt or the deficit variable. Countries whose national debt has a larger share in total EU debt pay lower interest rates than EU countries with smaller shares.
Liquidity risk premia are reduced with EMU membership, which points to an increase in financial market integration. For DM/Euro denominated bonds, EMU membership reduces the linear effect of debt on default risk premia but increases the non-linear, marginal effect. Accordingly, EMU members enjoy a lower risk premium than before, but this benefit declines with the size of public debt compared to Germany. 
